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1. INTRODUCTION
The welfare consequences of vertical mergers are highly controversial in com-
petition policy. A variety of pro-competitive e¢ ciency gains, from the elimination
of double marginalization to the solution of incentive problems caused by incom-
plete contracts, have traditionally been contrasted with a major anti-competitive
concern, vertical foreclosure, whereby vertically integrated rms would gain market
power by restricting supply (or demand) to downstream (upstream) competitors.4
Important merger and consolidation waves in high-tech industries (such as phar-
maceutical, biotech, electronics, energy, ITC, software, smartphones) since the early
90s, have more recently turned the attention of antitrust authorities and scholars
towards the e¤ects of vertical mergers on rms innovation activities.5 For in-
stance, discussing the case of Silicon Graphicsacquisition of Alias and Wavefront,
Christine Varney (1995)6 points at product innovation, positioning and design as
possible channels of anti-competitive e¤ects of vertical mergers: "[...] the com-
bined entity would not need to bar other software developers completely, but could
redirect them away from direct competition by, for example, encouraging the devel-
opment of products that are complement to, rather than direct substitutes for, Alias
and Wavefront software". More generally, the 2008 EU Guidelines on the assess-
ment of non-horizontal mergers treat reduction in innovation, quality and choice of
goods and services as su¢ cient reasons to prevent mergers on equal footing with
anti-competitive price increases and output restrictions.7
An interesting literature (discussed in detail in a separate section) has then
arisen on the interplay between rmsvertical relations and innovation, contrasting
the incentives to innovate of vertically integrated rms, their separated competitors,
and their non-integrated counterparts, and investigating how innovation activities,
in turn, a¤ect rmsincentives for vertical integration.
This paper contributes to this literature in two important ways. First, we focus
on independent rmsinnovation activities, such as product design, development,
and market positioning, which, while generating value to nal consumers, are also
likely to spill over prot opportunities to di¤erentiated competitors, for instance by
4Vertical foreclosure has been investigated by a vast literature in a variety of vertical integration
models, e.g., Salinger (1988), Ordover et al. (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990), Riordan and Salop
(1995), Riordan (1998), Choi and Yi (2000), Chen (2001), Chen and Riordan (2004). See Rey and
Tirole (2007) and Riordan (2008) for excellent surveys of this literature.
5The US Department of Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) have strength-
ened their focus on innovation since the mid-90s, formalizing the application of the antitrust laws
to innovative markets. As for vertical mergers, the DOJ Antitrust Division underlined that, under
certain conditions, vertical mergers may chill innovation (Sunshine, 1994). As reported in Gilbert
(2005), since then the proportion of US merger challenges where the DOJ and FTC raised con-
cerns about adverse innovation e¤ects has increased from 3% (in the period 1990-1994) to 18%
(for the period 1995-1999) and 38% (for the period 2000-2003).
6General Attorney Assistant for the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice from
February 2009 to August 2011.
7Adverse e¤ects on innovation have consequently been investigated by the Commission in
a number of recent cases of non-horizontal mergers, including Intel/Mc Afee, Arm/Gieseke &
Devrient/Gemalto Joint Venture, and Telefonica UK/Vodafone UK/Everything Everywhere Joint
Venture. For an interesting discussion of these cases, see Competition policy brief (April 2016).
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creating new contestable markets, enlarging existing ones, and strengthening hori-
zontal di¤erentiation. Second, we account for the highly competitive environment
which characterizes the merger and acquisition activity in innovative industries,8
by studying a new channel of downstream rent extraction through vertical mergers,
competition for integration, and its e¤ect on the independent rms incentive for
product innovation and social welfare.
In a nutshell, while the prot opportunities created by independent downstream
innovators can attract vertical takeovers,9 the spillover e¤ects of said innovation
activities would render all a¤ected downstream rms good alternative targets for
these takeovers, potentially competing for integration. We show that, by triggering
this competition, the upstream rms may even extract more than the downstream
rents produced by the innovation activities. Anticipating these e¤ects, the down-
stream innovators may refrain from investing in protable and socially valuable
innovations.
Our baseline model assumes a simple linear-pricing vertical setting,10 where
two innovative downstream rms produce a nal product using a generic input
supplied by an upstream monopolist. At the outset, the downstream rms decide
the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation of their varieties of nal product. Product
di¤erentiation directly carries value to nal consumers and hence enlarges total
demand, but it also yields downstream market segmentation, with positive e¤ects
on downstream prots and anti-competitive e¤ects on nal prices.11 Crucially,
it a¤ects the upstream monopolists incentive to vertically integrate too. Once
the di¤erentiation decision has been taken, the upstream monopolist can call the
downstream rms for independent price o¤ers in order to vertically merge with
one of them (at a xed integration cost). Either vertical separation or partial
vertical integration can emerge from this game. Vertical separation would leave
the downstream market as a symmetric duopoly of independent downstream rms.
Vertical integration would lead to an asymmetric duopoly, where the integrated
rm optimally prices the essential input to its downstream rival, the independent
8M&A on-line reviews and specialized intermediaries websites (e.g., investment bankers, busi-
ness brokers, investment management rms) immediately convey an idea of intense strate-
gic competition. For instance, Karl Hunt (ABI Capital ) stresses the importance of merger
competition as one of the takeovers patterns which o¤er systematic prot opportunities to
investors: "Takeovers often come in bunches  companies receiving bids are likely to see
their competitors receive bids too. Investment bankers perform the same analysis and sub-
mit the same ideas for growth and consolidation to numerous clients" (ABI Capital website:
http://apicapital.com/2017/01/20/takeover-targets/). A thorough illustration of the competitive
environment of the US Middle Market M&A activities can be found in Roberts (2009).
9Alfaro et al. (2016) provides interesting empirical evidence that, rather than triggering high
market prices through anti-competitive foreclosure, vertical mergers tend to be triggered by the
prot opportunities signalled by high market prices.
10Non-linear pricing has been extensively studied in the vertical relations literature, but it is
far from ubiquitous or fully e¢ cient in the real world. Accordingly, a signicant part of this
literature posits linear pricing and assumes, as we do, that vertical integration xes or softens
double marginalization. See, among many others, Salinger (1988), Ordover et al. (1990), Colangelo
(1995), Economides (1998), Hackner (2003), Arya et al. (2008).
11Here and throughout the paper, the term "market segmentation" is used in the broad sense
of a decrease in each rms demand sensitivity to competitorsprice changes.
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rm, and to its own downstream division.12
In this setting, vertical integration occurs in equilibrium only if it is protable,
in the sense that it o¤ers the two merging rms a positive net surplus from integra-
tion: the integrated rms prot, net of the integration cost, exceeds the total prot
the two merging rms would gain under vertical separation. As explained later on,
however, competition for integration sets the takeover price nally reaped by the
merged downstream rm at its outside option under vertical integration, that is,
the equilibrium prot of an independent rm, as weakened by the strong competi-
tive advantages of the integrated rm. This competition for integration channel of
rent extraction allows the upstream rm to reap more than the net surplus from
integration, and even to extract more than the overall downstream rents gener-
ated by product di¤erentiation. As a consequence, the downstream rms perceive
vertical integration as a threat to be preempted, if possible, by setting product char-
acteristics that make vertical integration unprotable. Otherwise, they set product
characteristics such as to soften rent extraction by maximizing the prospective prot
of an independent rm under vertical integration, and hence the takeover price.
Thus, how the threat of vertical integration a¤ects product di¤erentiation cru-
cially depends on how the net surplus from integration is a¤ected by product dif-
ferentiation. There are two sources of integration surplus in our model: double
marginalization softening and business stealing via rivals cost raising (or price
squeeze, in the antitrust law terminology). By charging a low input price to its
downstream division, an integrated rm can prot from softening (or even elimi-
nating) double marginalization from its segment of the downstream market (double
marginalization softening source). By opening a positive gap between the external
and the internal input prices, it can steal market share and prots from its down-
stream rival, the independent rm (business stealing source). Product di¤erentia-
tion strengthens the double marginalization softening source, as it enlarges the total
market size (by creating new value to consumers) and increases the downstream
prot margins (by segmenting the downstream market). It however weakens the
business stealing source, as the integrated rms nal demand becomes less elastic
to the independent rms price when the downstream market is more segmented.
One of the contributions of our paper is to show that the relative strength of
these two sources of integration surplus, and hence the resulting e¤ect of the verti-
cal integration threat on product di¤erentiation, crucially depend on two economic
forces: the size of the value creating content of product di¤erentiation (captured by
the market size e¤ect of di¤erentiation), and the intensity of downstream competi-
tion (captured as a switch from Cournot to Bertrand competition). When down-
stream competition is soft (Cournot competition), the integration surplus is high
either with strong di¤erentiation (as the double marginalization softening source of
surplus is strong here) or with weak di¤erentiation (as the business stealing source
12All our results go through under the alternative assumption that the integrated rm simply
transfers the essential input to its downstream division at cost. As discussed in detail below,
this assumption would however hinder interpretation. Besides this clarication role, our partially
integrated duopoly with optimal internal input pricing may also be of some independent interest.
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becomes strong there). Therefore, the downstream rms incentive to preempt
vertical integration may either weaken or strengthen their incentive for di¤erenti-
ation. Even in this case, however, when product di¤erentiation potentially o¤ers
high social value (strong di¤erentiation opportunities), vertical integration preemp-
tion reduces di¤erentiation. When downstream competition is intense (Bertrand
competition), the integration surplus monotonically increases with product di¤er-
entiation, which implies that vertical integration preemption now unambiguously
reduces product di¤erentiation. The intuition, detailed later on in the paper, relies
on a dampening e¤ect of intense downstream competition on the business stealing
source of integration surplus when products are weakly di¤erentiated. In terms
of social welfare, as long as the value creating content of product di¤erentiation
dominates the anti-competitive e¤ect of market segmentation, as in our baseline
model, social welfare is harmed by any preemptive reduction in di¤erentiation.
We present three extensions of the baseline model. The rst eliminates the
market size e¤ect (i.e., the value creating content) of product di¤erentiation, which
then turns into mere market segmentation. We show that vertical integration pre-
emption always strengthens di¤erentiation in this case, which however harms social
welfare now. This nding conrms the crucial role played by the value creating con-
tent of di¤erentiation in our previous results. It also suggests that while a threat of
downstream rent extraction via competition for integration is likely to cause a social
cost in terms of less product innovation in innovative and competitive industries, it
is likely to cause a social cost in terms of anti-competitive market segmentation in
mature industries, where the value creating content of di¤erentiation is probably
limited.
The second extension models competition at the product di¤erentiation stage,
showing that, albeit important, the e¤ects of non-cooperative di¤erentiation are to
a large extent orthogonal to the e¤ects of the vertical integration threat on product
di¤erentiation.
The last extension accounts for upstream competition. We show not only that
our competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to
upstream competition if, as intuition suggests, the upstream rms have su¢ ciently
high bargaining power at the integration stage, but also that its e¤ects can be am-
plied by competition for integration being played by vertical pairs of rms, which
can cause over-investment in vertical integration and downstream rent dissipation.
We postpone the discussion of the literature, policy implications, and further
motivating examples after we have presented the model and derived our results.
The resulting organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the baseline
model. Section 3 analyzes the competition for integration channel of downstream
rent extraction. Section 4 presents our main results on the e¤ects of the vertical
integration threat on product di¤erentiation. Section 5 collects the three extensions.
Section 6 discusses the literature. Section 7 o¤ers further motivation and policy
discussion, and some conclusive remarks. Appendix 1 shows the main proofs, but
most of the analytical work is collected in the on-line appendix 2.
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2. THE BASELINE MODEL
Setting and production technology. We consider an industry with upstream and
downstream markets. The upstream market is monopolized by rm U ,13 which
produces (for simplicity at zero cost) the sole input needed by two downstream
rms, D1 and D2, to produce the nal product with a one-to-one technology : one
unit of essential input for each unit of nal product. The nal product comes in
two varieties, variety 1 and variety 2; each of them exclusively produced and sold
to nal consumers by the homonymous downstream rm. Said varieties can be
homogeneous or horizontally di¤erentiated according to a product di¤erentiation
decision taken by the downstream rms before the production stage. Their nal
degree of substitutability in demand, , may range from 0 (independent products)
to 1 (perfect substitutes).
Stages and timing. The model consists of three sequential stages, illustrated
separately below. In stage 1, the downstream rms set the degree of product
di¤erentiation. In stage 2, the vertical structure of the industry is determined as
the outcome of a competitive integration game.14 If vertical integration occurs, the
upstream monopolist vertically integrates with one of the two downstream rms.15
In this case, we will refer to the integrated rm as to rm I, and to the downstream
independent rm as to rmN . If vertical integration does not occur, we are left with
the vertically separated structure of the industry mentioned before. In stage 3, rst
the essential input is optimally priced by the upstream monopolist, under vertical
separation, or by the upstream division of the vertically integrated rm, under
vertical integration. Then, duopoly competition takes place in the downstream
market: between the two downstream rms, under vertical separation, or between
the independent rm and the downstream division of the integrated rm, under
vertical integration. Production and prots are nally determined.
Product di¤erentiation stage. Either it consists of innovative product design or
mere market segmentation, horizontal product di¤erentiation typically involves ex-
ternalities across competitors, which clearly play an important role in rmscom-
petitive incentives to invest in di¤erentiation (see, e.g., Lambertini and Rossini,
1998). In our setting, such externalities are rather more important for enabling
the upstream rm to trigger downstream competition for vertical integration than
for their direct e¤ect on the downstream incentive for di¤erentiation. As for the
13 In section 5.3, we extend the model to upstream competition.
14The relative timing of the di¤erentiation and the integration stages rests on the idea that
product design, positioning, and marketing may be less reversible than the organizational form
of vertical relationships. Upstream rms may also lack su¢ cient expertise of the nal market to
assess the potential value of new products or publicity campaigns, and hence to determine takeover
prices, before those products or campaigns are developed and launched, and the downstream rms
investments in them are sunk.
15Like many other works on vertical integration (e.g., Hart and Tirole, 1990), we assume away
horizontal mergers, likewise the complete integration of the industry in a single monopoly. Both
assumptions can be motivated by the antitrust authorities banning horizontal or vertical mergers
leading to the full monopolization of the downstream market or of the entire industry. Prohibitive
re-organization costs may also justify the assumption that vertical integration cannot involve both
downstream rms.
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latter, our focus is on the e¤ect a prospective threat of vertical integration exerts
on it, and modelling competition at the di¤erentiation stage strongly complicates
the analysis without adding much insight on this e¤ect. For these reasons, we ini-
tially abstract from any strategic aspect related to competition at the di¤erentiation
stage. We concentrate on the downstream rmsincentive for product di¤erenti-
ation as measured by the joint-prot gain they would derive from a reduction in
product substitutability, ; from 1 (the perfect substitutes extreme) to any given
lower value b 2 [0; 1). We will denote it by bk(b):16 We then contrast di¤erentia-
tion incentives and costs when we assess the welfare e¤ects of vertical integration
through its impact on product di¤erentiation. Finally, in section 5.2 we extend the
model to non-cooperative di¤erentiation, and discuss robustness of our results.
Integration game. In our model, the upstream rm has identical opportunities
to appropriate downstream value and prots generated by product di¤erentiation
by merging with any of the two downstream rms. It is therefore in the position of
triggering downstream competition for integration after the di¤erentiation decision
has been taken by the downstream rms. We model the vertical integration stage
as a rst-price auction. The upstream monopolist calls the downstream rms for
simultaneous and independent price o¤ers in order to integrate with one of them.
On the basis of the o¤ers received, the upstream monopolist then decides whether
to vertically integrate with the downstream rm asking for the lowest price, thus
paying the lowest bid. In the case of tie, we assume that each downstream rm
has fty percent probability of merging with the upstream rm, should the latter
decide to accept the o¤er. We further assume that vertical integration involves
a xed integration cost, denoted by E:17 In section 5.3, we show robustness of
our competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction to upstream
competition by extending the model to a successive duopoly, and the integration
stage to a simultaneous integration game played by predetermined pairs of upstream
and downstream rms.
Market stage. The competition for integration channel of downstream rent ex-
traction can be shown without assuming any specic model for the downstream
market. In this part of the analysis, we just adopt a reduced-form of the rms
equilibrium prots which encompasses a range of horizontally di¤erentiated duopoly
models.18 The upstream incentive for integration, and the e¤ects of vertical inte-
gration on product di¤erentiation and welfare, however, crucially depend on the
combination of two economic forces at work in the downstream market: the in-
tensity of downstream competition (captured here as a switch from Cournot to
Bertrand competition) and the value creating content of product di¤erentiation
(captured here by a market size e¤ect of di¤erentiation). To show the role of
16The perfect substitutes extreme,  = 1, is used here just as a convenient reference point to
measure the incentive for di¤erentiation. In fact, in our model, the downstream rmsjoint-prot
gain from di¤erentiating products from any initial degree 1  to any nal degree 1 b > 1 
is always given by the di¤erence bk(b)  bk().
17See Hart and Tirole (1990) for an extensive discussion of the organizational, incentive, and
legal costs of vertical integration which can be summarized in a xed integration cost term.
18As intuitively argued below and formally shown in appendix 2.
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these forces, we will then "unbundle" the reduced-form adopting a standard linear
quadratic specication of consumerspreferences.
3. RENT EXTRACTION VIA COMPETITION FOR INTEGRATION
The reduced-form assumes regular and symmetric demand functions of the two
varieties of nal product.19 Under vertical separation, the upstream rm optimally
sets a symmetric price for the essential input supplied to the two downstream rms,
wD(), leading to a symmetric duopoly equilibrium in the downstream market.
U () and D() will denote the equilibrium prots of the upstream rm and each
of the two downstream rms; pD() and qD() the symmetric price and quantity
of each variety of nal product.
Under vertical integration, the integrated rm optimally prices the essential
input supplied to the independent rm and to its own downstream division.20 Con-
sistently with intuition, we assume that the internal input price charged to its own
downstream division, wDI (); never exceeds the external input price charged to the
independent rm, wN (); so that the resulting downstream equilibrium is generally
asymmetric.21 N (); DI (); and I() will denote the equilibrium prots of the
independent rm, the downstream division of the integrated rm, and the overall
integrated rm, respectively; pN () and qN () the equilibrium price and quantity
of the independent rms variety of nal product; pDI () and qDI () those of the
integrated rms variety.22 The reduced-form nally posits:
Assumption 1.
A1.1) 0N () < 0; 
0
D() < 0; 8 2 [0; 1]:
A1.2) N () < D(); 8 2 (0; 1):
A1.3) N () > 0; 8 2 [0; 1); N (1) = 0:
Part A1.1 states that the equilibrium prots of both the independent rm (under
vertical integration) and any downstream rm (under vertical separation) monoton-
ically increase with product di¤erentiation (i.e., they monotonically decrease with
19Symmetry in demand just eliminates distracting sources of rm asymmetry than vertical
relationships.
20As explained later on, assuming that the integrated rm just transfers internally the input at
zero-price would not a¤ect any of our results. In our analysis, however, this assumption would
articially restrict the integrated rms ability to set high input prices to contrast industry prot
erosion due to downstream competition, a strategy on the contrary always feasible for a separated
upstream rm. Then, for a spurious reason, the upstream rms incentive to integrate would
become negative when downstream competition is intense (Bertrand competition) and varieties
are close substitutes.
21 In the linear quadratic specication of the downstream market adopted in the next section,
wN () strictly exceeds wDI () except under Bertrand competition with perfect substitute varieties
( = 1).
22Dropping the functional notations, prots are dened as: D = (pD   wD) qD and U =
2wDqD , under vertical separation; N = (pN   wN ) qN , DI =
 
pDI   wDI

qDI , and I =
DI + wN qN + wDI qDI , under vertical integration.
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): This reects both the value creating content of product di¤erentiation, expand-
ing nal demand and prots, and its anti-competitive e¤ect via market segmenta-
tion, increasing the equilibrium prices and prots of symmetric competitors (the two
downstream rms under vertical separation), as well as the equilibrium price and
prot of a high cost competitor (the independent rm under vertical integration).
Part A1.2 relies on the tougher competitive pressure faced by the independent
rm under vertical integration (i.e., competition from the integrated rm, which can
set the downstream marginal costs), relative to the competitive pressure faced by
any downstream rm under vertical separation (i.e., competition from a symmetric
competitor).23
Finally, part A1.3 shows the e¤ect of product di¤erentiation on the possibil-
ity of market foreclosure under vertical integration. Competing away downstream
market share and prots gives the integrated rm a strategic incentive to raise the
independent rms cost,24 which would however reduce input sales. Intuitively, the
strategic incentive to raise the rivals cost weakens with product di¤erentiation (it
vanishes altogether when varieties are independent in demand).
Consider now the integration game. The two downstream rms carries identi-
cal value as potential targets for the upstream rms takeover. Furthermore, they
symmetrically face the risk of being left in the weak prot position of an indepen-
dent rm under vertical integration (stated in A1.2). Competition for integration,
however, will be e¤ective only if vertical integration overall promises a net surplus
to the merging rms. Formally, we call gross surplus from integration, S(), the
di¤erence between the overall prot of a vertically integrated rm and the overall
prots the two rms potentially involved in the merger (the upstream monopolist
and one downstream rm) would gain under vertical separation:
S() = I()  U ()  D(): (1)
Integration is protable if the gross surplus from integration exceeds the xed
integration cost:
S()  E > 0: (2)
Assume now that the merger takes place at a takeover price P . The upstream
monopolists net gain from merging (compared to vertical separation) would be:
I()  U ()  P   E;
or, using (1),
(S()  E) + (D()  P ) : (3)
With these preliminaries in place, the following lemma characterizes the equi-
librium outcome of the integration game in terms of the protability condition (2),
showing the competition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction.
23Although not specied in A1.2, with perfect substitute varieties,  = 1, we must allow either
for D(1) > N (1) = 0 or for D(1) = N (1) = 0 to encompass Cournot (rst case) and Bertrand
competition (second case). With independent varieties,  = 0, downstream competition vanishes,
so that N (0) = D(0):
24As rst argued by Salop and Sche¤man (1983).
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Lemma 1. If condition (2) holds, then vertical integration occurs in equilibrium
at the takeover price P  = N (); so that both the merged and the independent
downstream rms nally earn N (). If condition (2) is violated, then vertical
integration does not occur in equilibrium, so that both downstream rms nally
earn D():
When vertical integration is protable, competition between the downstream
rms to be integrated causes the merging downstream rm to reap just its out-
side option under vertical integration: the equilibrium prot of the independent
rm, N (): The upstream monopolist, in contrast, collects more than the net
surplus from integration, as it is apparent from equation (3) once recalled that
D() > N () by A1.2. When, on the contrary, vertical integration is not prof-
itable, in equilibrium the downstream rms independently refrain from competing
for integration, thereby avoiding integration.25
From lemma 1 we gain intuition of two strategic motives the competition for
integration channel of rent extraction introduces in the downstream rmsincen-
tive for product di¤erentiation: 1) preempt integration by inducing, if possible, a
negative net surplus from integration; 2) sustain the independent rms prot, and
hence the expected takeover price, if integration cannot be avoided.
4. VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION
In view of lemma 1, the e¤ect of product di¤erentiation on the vertical structure
of the industry, and hence on the threat of rent extraction, rests on the sign of the
net surplus from integration, S() E, over the product substitutability range  2
[0; 1]: In this section, we rst show how downstream market competition combines
with the value creating content of product di¤erentiation to shape the gross surplus
from integration, S(), and hence the upstream rms incentive for integration. We
then turn to the e¤ect of the vertical integration threat on the downstream rms
incentive to di¤erentiate products and welfare.
4.1. Product differentiation and upstream incentive to integrate
In our model, an integrated and a separated upstream rm can equally use the
input prices to contrast industry prot erosion due to downstream competition.
Furthermore, an integrated rm can always replicate the vertical separation equi-
librium by charging, internally and externally, the same (symmetric) input price a
separated upstream rm would optimally choose. Therefore, the gross surplus from
integration can never be negative.
Positive integration surplus can come from two advantages of vertical integra-
tion, obviously linked to the consequent ability for the upstream rm to collect
downstream prots directly: 1) by setting a low internal input price, the integrated
25To be precise, when condition (2) is violated the game admits two equilibrium outcomes.
As only the one in the statement survives the application of commonly used renement criteria
like Pareto dominance, risk dominance, and trembling hand perfection, we adopt it as the most
natural outcome when integration is not protable (see the proof of the lemma in appendix 1).
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rm can prot from softening or even eliminating double marginalization in its
segment of the downstream market (double marginalization softening); 2) by open-
ing a gap between the external and the internal input price, it can compete away
downstream market share and prots from the independent rm (business stealing
via rivals cost raising).
The rst source of integration surplus strengthens with product di¤erentiation,
as downstream prot margins, and hence the gain from softening double marginal-
ization, increase when the market becomes more segmented. Moreover, it is boosted
by any direct value consumers may derive from product di¤erentiation, as the down-
stream market size, and hence the gain of avoiding double marginalization in one
segment of it, would increase. The second source, on the contrary, weakens with
product di¤erentiation, as the integrated rms nal demand becomes less elastic
to the independent rms price when nal products are more di¤erentiated. Such a
business stealing value of vertical integration is however crucially a¤ected also by
the intensity of competition in the downstream market: as we show below, intense
downstream competition (i.e., Bertrand rather than Cournot competition) damp-
ens this source of surplus from integration when products are weakly di¤erentiatied,
that is, exactly in the case where this source would tend to be strong.
We illustrate these e¤ects within a standard linear-quadratic model of di¤eren-
tiated duopoly, which generates all properties we assumed for the reduced-form of
section 3.26 Preferences of the representative nal consumer are specied as: 27
U = a(q1 + q2)  1
2
 
q21 + q
2
2 + 2q1q2

+m; (4)
leading to the inverse demand system for the two varieties of nal product:
pi = a  qi   qj (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j). (5)
Notice that product di¤erentiation directly generates social value to consumers
in this model: for given quantities (q1 and q2), utility (4) and demand prices (5)
increase with product di¤erentiation (i.e., they decrease with ).
Vertical integration and vertical separation equilibria, under Cournot and under
Bertrand competition, are detailed in appendix 2. Here we focus on the resulting
shapes of the gross surplus from integration (1) over the product substitutability
range  2 [0; 1], and their intuition.
Proposition 1. If downstream competition is soft (Cournot competition), the
gross surplus from integration, SC (), is U-shaped in product substitutability, ;
with global maximum at  = 0: If downstream competition is intense (Bertrand
competition), the gross surplus from integration, SB (), monotonically decreases
26Originally introduced by Bowley (1924), this model has been subsequently popularized by
Spence (1976), Dixit (1979), and Sing and Vives (1984).
27 In (4) and (5) below: a is a positive parameter (xing the height of the demand functions);
q1; q2 and m denote the consumption of variety one, variety two, and a numeraire good; p1 and
p2 are the prices of the two varieties. Maximizing utility (4), subject to the budget constraint
p1q1 + p2q2 +m = R, gives the demand system (5).
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with product substitutability,  (i.e., it monotonically increases with product di¤er-
entiation), vanishing at  = 1:
The U-shaped pattern of the gross surplus from integration under Cournot com-
petition is illustrated in Figure 1a, and its monotonically decreasing pattern under
Bertrand competition is shown in Figure 1b. Notice that the gross surplus from
integration is una¤ected by the intensity of downstream competition when varieties
are independent in demand: SC (0) = SB (0)  S (0).
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The interpretation of the U-shaped surplus under Cournot competition imme-
diately relates to our previous discussion of the two sources of integration surplus.
The surplus is high with strongly di¤erentiated products (low values of ) because
the rst source, double marginalization softening, is strong there; it turns high again
with poorly di¤erentiated products (high values of ) because the second source,
business stealing via rivals cost rising, becomes strong when products are close
substitutes. Following this interpretation, the monotonic pattern of the integration
surplus under Bertrand competition should arise from a dampening e¤ect intense
downstream competition would exert on the business stealing source of integration
surplus, making the shape of the gross surplus mirror the monotonically decreasing
(in , increasing in di¤erentiation) strength of the double marginalization softening
source.
To show this dampening e¤ect, consider the case of perfect substitutes ( = 1).
Under Bertrand competition, a separated upstream rm would be able to induce
and reap the (maximum) industry monopoly prot by symmetrically pricing the
input at the monopoly price of the nal product, as downstream prot margins
are zero. A vertically integrated rm can at most reach the same prot, but now
adopting any of the following two equivalent strategies: 1) the same as the separated
upstream rms strategy, that is, setting both the internal and the external input
prices at the nal product monopoly price, thereby collecting the full monopoly
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prot as upstream division prot; or 2) a foreclosure-business stealing strategy,
which consists in pricing the input internally at (zero) cost, and externally at a
level su¢ ciently high to allow its downstream division to engage in monopoly pricing
without the fear of being displaced by the independent rm, thereby collecting the
full monopoly prot as downstream division prot. Now, since an integrated and a
separated upstream rms would make the same prot (and downstream prots are
zero in the vertical separation equilibrium), the gross surplus from integration is nil
under Bertrand competition. Furthermore, the business stealing (foreclosure) value
of vertical integration is nil as well, as the foreclosure strategy does not o¤er any
extra prot opportunity to an integrated rm. Under Cournot competition, on the
contrary, the gross surplus from integration is positive exactly because of a positive
business stealing (foreclosure) value of vertical integration. As downstream prot
margins are positive now, a separated upstream rm will never be able neither
to induce nor to collect the full monopoly prot in the industry. An integrated
rm, in contrast, will be able to do both, but only through (that is, thanks to) the
foreclosure-business stealing strategy.
Back to Bertrand competition, any slight degree of product di¤erentiation breaks
the tie between the strategies mentioned above, making the integrated rm strictly
prefer a strategy of (almost symmetrically) high external and internal input prices
(close to the pricing strategy of a separated upstream rm) over a foreclosure-
business stealing strategy of large gaps between the external and the internal input
prices. Indeed, while the main potential problem with the rst strategy, double
marginalization, is still negligible, the second strategy would now waste the oppor-
tunity to extract at least part of the consumersgain from variety in the form of
upstream prots.28 More generally, smaller downstream prot margins under in-
tense competition make it relatively more e¢ cient to generate and collect industry
prots (in the form of upstream prots) via high input prices, which reduces the
business stealing value of vertical integration.29
28 Interestingly, constraining the integrated rm to transfer the input internally at zero-price
would only a¤ect the shape of Bertrand gross surplus from integration. From  = 0, it would
now monotonically decrease with  down to a negative minimum, increasing then in  up to zero
as varieties become perfect substitutes. At the perfect substitutes extreme, the integrated rm
would now be constrained to collect the full monopoly prot through the foreclosure strategy,
while a separated upstream rm would still do so by symmetrically pricing the input at the nal
product monopoly price. While the surplus from integration would still be zero at  = 1, it
would turn negative for mild degrees of di¤erentiation. This conrms that, from the viewpoint
of the integrated rm, price strategies of high but relatively equalized input prices (close to
a separated upstream rms pricing) dominate strategies of wide input price gaps (and strong
business stealing) when competition is intense and products are close substitutes. Notice nally
that the above changes in Bertrand integration surplus would anyway leave our results una¤ected:
for negative values, the shape of the surplus is irrelevant for the incentive to di¤erentiate products,
and monotonicity is preserved for positive values.
29 In the linear-quadratic model, the optimal external input price set by an integrated rm,
wN (), always equals the (symmetric) input price a separated upstream rm would optimally
charge, wD(), irrespective of the mode of competition and . The di¤erence in the integrated
rms pricing strategies under the two modes of competition arises from the internal input price,
wDI (). Under Cournot, wDI () is always lower than wN (); and shows an inverted U -shaped
pattern in : it starts at zero (the marginal cost) at  = 0, and ends at zero at  = 1: Under
Bertrand, wDI () monotonically increases with , again starting at zero at  = 0, but reaching
now the external price wN () at  = 1.
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Turning to the integration stage of the model, lemma 1 and proposition 1 im-
mediately imply the vertical structure of the industry that will emerge from the
integration game as a function of the intensity of downstream competition, the
degree of product di¤erentiation, , and the integration cost level, E.
Corollary 1. With soft downstream competition (Cournot competition), ver-
tical integration arises in equilibrium: i) for any value of  if integration costs are
small: Es 2 [0; SC(e)];30 ii) for high or for low, but not for intermediate, values
of  if integration costs are intermediate: Em 2 (SC(e); SC(1)); iii) for low values
of  if integration costs are high: Eh 2 [SC(1); S (0)); iv) for no values of  if
integration costs are prohibitive: Ep  S (0) :
Corollary 2. With intense downstream competition (Bertrand competition),
vertical integration arises in equilibrium: i) for su¢ ciently low values of  if the
integration costs are non-prohibitive: E 2 (0; S (0)); ii) for no values of  if inte-
gration costs are prohibitive: Ep  S (0) :
Corollaries 1 and 2 are illustrated in Figures 1a and 1b, respectively. In Figure
1a, representative values for the four classes of integration costs of corollary 1 are
marked on the vertical axis. The net surplus from integration is always positive
with the small cost Es, and always negative with the prohibitive cost Ep. With
the intermediate cost Em, it is negative in the intermediate interval of product
substitutability [m1; m2], positive outside that interval. With the high cost Eh,
the net surplus from integration is positive in the interval [0; h], negative outside it.
In Figure 1b, the illustration of corollary 2 just requires an example of prohibitive
costs, Ep, whereby the net surplus from integration is always negative, and one of
non-prohibitive costs, E, whereby the net surplus is positive in the interval [0; E ];
negative outside it.
4.2. vertical integration and downstream incentive for differen-
tiation
At the di¤erentiation stage, the two downstream rms hold identical prot ex-
pectations under any future evolution of the game: the independent rms prot
N (); under vertical integration (by lemma 1); the symmetric downstream prot
D(); under vertical separation. Let () generically denote their common ex-
pectation. For any given di¤erentiation opportunity b 2 [0; 1); we measure their
incentive for product di¤erentiation by the joint-prot gain they would derive from
decreasing  from 1 to b:
bk (b) = 2 [(b)  (1)] : (6)
To assess how vertical integration threats a¤ect the downstream incentive for
di¤erentiation, we use the case of prohibitive integration costs (i.e., Ep  S(0) in
corollaries 1 and 2), whereby no integration threat can ever arise, as a benchmark.
30Where SC(e) = Min

SC().
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A useful interpretation of this case is that of high expected legal costs induced by
a strict antitrust policy towards vertical mergers. The benchmark incentive for
di¤erentiation, bkp (b) = 2 [D(b)  D(1)] ; b 2 [0; 1); (7)
will just reect the downstream rms incentive to expand demand (market size
e¤ect of di¤erentiation) and soften each others symmetric competitive pressure
(market segmentation e¤ect of di¤erentiation).
We start with the case of intense downstream competition. Recall that, with
Bertrand competition, D(1) = N (1) = 0: The benchmark incentive (7) then
reduces to: bkp (b) = 2D(b); b 2 [0; 1): (8)
By corollary 2, any integration cost E < Ep is associated with a critical value
E 2 (0; 1) such that the integration threat is e¤ective only for b < E (see Figure
1b). This leads to the incentive for di¤erentiation:
bkE (b) = ( 2N (b) for b 2 [0; E)
2D(b) for b 2 [E ; 1]. (9)
As N (b) < D(b) for any b 2 [0; E) (by A1.2), we immediately have:
Proposition 2. When downstream competition is intense, a vertical integra-
tion threat always reduces the downstream rms incentive for product di¤erentia-
tion.
Proposition 2 is illustrated in Figure 2. The benchmark incentive for di¤erentia-
tion (bkp in the Figure) follows the black solid line from  = 1 to  = 0. The incentive
for di¤erentiation with any non-prohibitive integration cost (bkE in the Figure), is
illustrated by the grey line. It equals the benchmark one as long as the integra-
tion threat is not e¤ective (b > E), jumping downward and then lying below the
benchmark incentive as the integration threat becomes e¤ective (b  E).
Figure 2
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The interpretation of proposition 2 relies on the fact that, as intense down-
stream competition dampens the business stealing value of vertical integration, the
upstream incentive to integrate monotonically increases with product di¤erentia-
tion and its value creation content. As a consequence, when the integration threat
becomes e¤ective, the strategic motive of preempting rent extraction via compe-
tition for integration unambiguously weakens the downstream rmsincentive for
di¤erentiation.
We turn now to the case of soft competition. Notice rst that also with Cournot
competition N (1) = 0 (as the integrated rm forecloses the market when products
are perfect substitutes), but now D(1) > 0 (as prot margins are positive in a
symmetric homogenous Cournot duopoly).
The benchmark incentive for di¤erentiation is given by equation (7). All other
cases of corollary 1 must be taken separately. With small integration costs, Es;
vertical integration will always occur, so that the incentive for di¤erentiation be-
comes: bks (b) = 2N (b) for b 2 [0; 1): (10)
Any intermediate integration cost Em is associated with two critical values
of , 0 < m1 < m2 < 1, such that the vertical integration threat is e¤ective
only for values of b lying outside the interval [m1; m2] (as shown in Figure 1a).
As integration (and market foreclosure) would occur at  = 1; the incentive for
di¤erentiation becomes:
bkm (b) = ( 2N (b) for b 2 [0; m1) [ (m2; 1)2D(b) for b 2 [m1; m2]: (11)
Finally, any high integration cost Eh is associated with a critical value h 2 (0; 1)
such that the vertical integration threat is e¤ective only for b < h (see Figure 1a).
Since now vertical integration (and foreclosure) would not occur for  = 1; the
incentive for di¤erentiation is given by:
bkh (b) = ( 2[N (b)  D(1)] for b 2 [0; h)
2[D(b)  D(1)] for b 2 [h; 1). (12)
The next proposition shows that, when downstream competition is soft, a ver-
tical integration threat may either weaken or strengthen the incentive for di¤eren-
tiation.
Proposition 3. If downstream competition is soft: i) with high integration
costs, a vertical integration threat always reduces the downstream rms incentive
for product di¤erentiation; ii) with intermediate integration costs, preempting in-
tegration strengthens the downstream rmsincentive to attain intermediate degrees
of di¤erentiation; iii) when integration can not be preempted because of small in-
tegration costs, vertical integration increases the downstream rms incentive for
di¤erentiation unless the di¤erentiation opportunities are small.
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Part i) of proposition 3 is illustrated in Figure 3, parts ii) and iii) in Figure
4. In Figure 3, the incentive for di¤erentiation with high integration costs, bkh (the
grey solid line), is contrasted with the benchmark incentive, bkp (the black solid
line). As in the case of intense competition depicted in Figure 2, bkh equals the
benchmark incentive as long as the integration threat is not e¤ective (b > h); it
jumps downward and then lies below the benchmark incentive as the integration
threat becomes e¤ective (b  h). Even if, with soft competition, the business
stealing value of vertical integration is strong for weak di¤erentiation, high inte-
gration costs neutralize its e¤ect, so that the dominant force at work is still the
rst source of integration value, double marginalization softening, strengthened by
product di¤erentiation and its value creation content. Then, like in the case of
intense competition, an e¤ective threat of integration unambiguously reduces the
downstream rmsincentive for di¤erentiation.
Figure 4 compares the benchmark incentive, bkp (the black solid line), with the
incentive for di¤erentiation when integration costs are intermediate, bkm (the grey
dash line), or small, bks (the black dash line). With intermediate integration costs,
the business stealing value of vertical integration alters our previous preemption
result. The integration threat now becomes e¤ective either for strong (b < m1)
or for weak (b > m2) degrees of di¤erentiation. bkm then equals bks (i.e., the in-
centive for di¤erentiation when integration occurs notwithstanding di¤erentiation)
for di¤erentiation opportunities outside the intermediate interval [m1; m2], while
it exceeds both bks and bkp within the interval. Vertical integration preemption may
now either strengthen or weaken the downstream incentive for di¤erentiation.
Finally, with small integration costs vertical integration occurs for any degree of
di¤erentiation. The associated incentive for di¤erentiation, bks, is greater than the
benchmark incentive, bkp, except when the di¤erentiation opportunities are small.
The intuition relies on the second strategic motive, we noticed from lemma 1, the
competition for integration channel of rent extraction introduces in the downstream
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incentive for di¤erentiation: sustaining the independent rms prot, and hence the
expected takeover price, if integration cannot be avoided. In this case, the incentive
for di¤erentiation is strengthened by the downstream rms common interest to
eliminate market foreclosure, reduce the integrated rms incentive to raise the
rivals cost, and soften the competitive pressure of a more e¢ cient competitor, the
integrated rm. These e¤ects require that the di¤erentiation opportunities are not
so small to leave the independent rms prot anyway negligible, in which case the
benchmark incentive to soften each others competitive pressure in the downstream
market (under vertical separation) turns out to be stronger.
4.3. Vertical integration and welfare
Although product di¤erentiation can cause anti-competitive market segmenta-
tion, social value creation can well be its prevailing welfare e¤ect when innovative
products, or simply better information on new or existing ones, are introduced. If
so, our previous results immediately raise the concern that a prospective threat of
vertical integration can impose a social cost in terms of less product di¤erentiation,
especially in innovative and competitive industries.
In our linear quadratic specication, the market size e¤ect of di¤erentiation is
indeed strong enough to make the value creation e¤ect of di¤erentiation dominate
its anti-competitive e¤ect, and hence total market surplus (consumer surplus plus
industry prots) increase with di¤erentiation, in both vertical structures of the
industry (separation and integration) and both modes of competition (Cournot
and Bertrand).31 Net welfare losses from vertical integration preemption via less
di¤erentiation (proposition 2 and rst two parts of proposition 3) would then just
require that the decrease in total market surplus due to less di¤erentiation is not
outweighed by any possible reduction in di¤erentiation costs.
The easiest way to show this possibility is to assume L  shaped di¤erentiation
costs, whereby any degree of di¤erentiation up to a maximum value 1    > 0
can be achieved at a xed di¤erentiation cost F . Consider the case of intense
(Bertrand) competition depicted in Figure 2. As the di¤erentiation incentive bk(b)
is piecewise increasing in the di¤erentiation opportunities, jumping downwards as
the integration threat becomes e¤ective ( = E); integration preemption will a¤ect
the optimal degree of di¤erentiation only if  is lower than (but not too far from)
E , and of course F < bkp(): Because of the integration threat, the downstream
rms would then select E instead of : Relative to the benchmark, society would
su¤er a reduction of total market surplus (due to less di¤erentiation in the same
vertical structure, separation) with no di¤erentiation cost savings.
Of course, neither an actual preemptive reduction in product di¤erentiation nor
its e¤ect on social welfare strictly depend on L  shaped di¤erentiation costs. The
31More precisely, as shown in appendix 2, total market surplus always increases with di¤eren-
tiation except in the case of small di¤erentiation opportunities in Bertrand vertical separation
equilibrium. In this case, intense competition magnies the anti-competitive e¤ect of a mild dif-
ferentiation of homogeneous varieties, while the value creation e¤ect of di¤erentiation (market size
e¤ect) is still negligible.
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argument above would similarly go through with variable di¤erentiation costs, pro-
vided that the increase in the total di¤erentiation cost between E and  is not too
steep. Admittedly, for the downwards or upwards jumps in di¤erentiation incen-
tives caused by vertical integration threats to a¤ect the actual degrees of di¤eren-
tiation, the role of variable di¤erentiation costs in the rmsoptimal di¤erentiation
choice must somehow be restricted. Nevertheless, cost structures biased towards
xed rather than (steep) variable costs do not seem implausible for activities like
product design, development and launch, or publicity.32
With soft (Cournot) competition and intermediate integration costs, integration
preemption may require to increase product di¤erentiation relative to the bench-
mark (second part of proposition 3). Using a similar argument, social welfare would
increase. It is however important to note that, also in the case of intermediate inte-
gration costs, vertical integration preemption would require less di¤erentiation, and
imply lower welfare, when the di¤erentiation opportunities are strong. More gener-
ally, our results overall indicate that, irrespective of the mode of competition, less
di¤erentiation and lower welfare are the e¤ects of vertical integration preemption
when the di¤erentiation opportunities, and hence their value creating potential, are
strong.
Finally, vertical integration can never be preempted when competition is soft
and integration costs are small, in which case the incentive for di¤erentiation is gen-
erally stronger than the benchmark one (third part of proposition 3). To compare
social welfare, notice rst that, for any given degree of di¤erentiation, total mar-
ket surplus is greater in the vertically integrated equilibrium than in the vertically
separated equilibrium.33 To this gain (arising from the social benet of less double
marginalization in the industry), on the benets side of the small integration costs
case we must add the increase in total market surplus due to more di¤erentiation.
On the costs side, we need to account for the integration cost and any additional
di¤erentiation costs. We prove in appendix 2 that the overall e¤ect on social welfare
is always positive.
5. ROBUSTNESS AND EXTENSIONS
5.1. Mere market segmentation
Matsushima (2009) argues that vertical integration may cause a welfare loss in
terms of anti-competitive market segmentation. In this section, we show that anti-
competitive market segmentation is also the net welfare e¤ect of vertical integration
preemption in our model, once we eliminate the value creation content of product
di¤erentiation, and hence its market size e¤ect.34 Contrasting this with our previous
32These activities typically generate substantial initial costs (e.g., R&D, marketing and publicity
strategic consultancy) to identify the alternative options. These costs are to a large extent xed
relative to the more or less ambitious targets of the di¤erent options, the implementation of which
would then carry di¤erent (i.e., variable, in our sense) costs. See, e.g., Trott (2008).
33As shown in appendix 2, this holds under both modes of competition.
34As discussed in section 6, the channels through which vertical integration a¤ects product
di¤erentiation in Matsushima and in our model are however very di¤erent.
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results, one can argue that while vertical integration should raise concerns of under-
investment in socially valuable di¤erentiation activities in innovative industries,
where the value creation content of product di¤erentiation is likely to be strong, it
should raise concerns of anti-competitve market segmentation in mature industries,
where the value creation content of product di¤erentiation is probably more limited.
Following previous literature, we eliminate the market size e¤ect of di¤erentia-
tion by adopting the following version of linear-quadratic preferences: 35
U = a(q1 + q2)  1
2
[(2  )  q21 + q22+ 2q1q2] +m;
which yields the inverse demand system:
pi = a  (2  ) qi   qj (i; j = 1; 2; i 6= j).
For given quantities, the direct e¤ect of  on utility and demand prices does
not show anymore value and demand creation through di¤erentiation. This leaves
di¤erentiation just carrying market segmentation.36
In appendix 2, we rst show that Assumption 1 still holds in Cournot vertical
separation and vertical integration equilibria under the new specication of prefer-
ences. We next prove that, in the new specication, the gross surplus from integra-
tion, Sc(), is strictly positive and monotonically increasing in  (i.e., monotonically
decreasing with product di¤erentiation). Consistently with our previous interpreta-
tion of the U shaped pattern of the integration surplus under Cournot competition
and standard preferences, removing the market size e¤ect of di¤erentiation weakens
the double marginalization softening source of surplus, that is, the source of surplus
positively a¤ected by product di¤erentiation; the shape of the surplus will then just
mirror the strength of the business stealing source, monotonically increasing in 
(decreasing with di¤erentiation).
Next, from lemma 1 and the shape of the gross surplus from integration, we dis-
tinguish three crucial classes of integration costs: prohibitive, still our benchmark
case (now identied by Ep  Sc(1)), whereby no integration threat can ever oc-
cur; intermediate or high, Ec 2 [Sc(0); Sc(1)), whereby each integration cost level
identies a critical value of product substitutability, c(Ec) 2 [0; 1), such that the
integration threat is e¤ective only for  > c(Ec) (i.e., for su¢ ciently low degrees
of di¤erentiation); small, dened now by Es < Sc(0), whereby vertical integration
always occurs.
As N (1) = 0 and D(1) > 0 (for the same reasons explained in the previous
35Originally proposed by Shubik and Levitan (1980), this version has been used, among others,
by De Fraja and Norman (1993), Martin (2002), Motta (2004), Calzolari and Denicoló (2013).
36See appendix 2 for a more detailed discussion on the way this version eliminates the consumers
preference for di¤erentiation, and hence the market size e¤ect, which characterize the standard
linear-quadratic specication of preferences.
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section), the incentive for di¤erentiation in the three cases is:bkp(b)  2 [cD(b)  cD(1)] ; 8b 2 [0; 1] ;
bkc(b) = ( 2cD(b); b 2 [0; c(Ec)]
2cN ; b 2 (c(Ec); 1] ;bks(b) = 2cN (b); 8b 2 [0; 1] :
Preempting integration by strategically altering product di¤erentiation is pos-
sible only with intermediate or high integration costs, and it would always require
to choose degrees of di¤erentiation higher than a critical level 1   c(Ec). As, by
inspection, bkc(b) exceeds bkp(b) over the entire interval b 2 [0; c(Ec)] ; we can
conclude that vertical integration preemption always incentivizes rms to increase
product di¤erentiation in this specication of the model. As for the welfare con-
sequences of this e¤ect, we show in appendix 2 that, by carrying anti-competitive
market segmentation with no additional value to consumers, stronger di¤erentiation
always reduces total market surplus in this specication, irrespective of the vertical
structure of the industry. Thus, even disregarding any possible extra di¤erentiation
cost, vertical integration preemption always reduces social welfare.37
5.2. Non-cooperative differentiation
In this section, we account for the role horizontal di¤erentiation spillovers would
play at the di¤erentiation stage, should the downstream rms take their di¤erenti-
ation decision competitively. More precisely, we substantiate our initial claim that,
albeit important, this role is to a large extent orthogonal to the e¤ect of a vertical
integration threat on product di¤erentiation.
Lambertini and Rossini (1998) consider a simultaneous di¤erentiation game as
a pre-stage of a standard linear quadratic di¤erentiated duopoly. We adopt their
game here as the di¤erentiation stage of our model. Each downstream rm must
simultaneously decide whether to pay or not a xed di¤erentiation cost F . If no
rm invests, products remain perfect substitutes ( = 1). If only one rm in-
vests, product substitutability reduces to b1 2 (0; 1): If both rms invest, product
substitutability further drops to b2 2 (0; b1). Payo¤s are determined by the di¤er-
entiation cost, F , and the symmetric prot expectations of the downstream rms
at the di¤erentiation stage, (), derived in section 4.2. The game is therefore
symmetric, as in Lambertini and Rossini.
Di¤erentiation spillovers clearly set the main strategic incentive in this game:
free riding on the opponents investment in di¤erentiation.38 This strategic in-
37 In appendix 2 we also show that bks(b) > bkp(b) except when the di¤erentiation opportunities
are very small (i.e, b is very close to one). That is, unavoidable vertical integration (under small
integration costs) generally strengthens the incentive for di¤erentiation relative to the benchmark
case where vertical integration can never occur. The welfare comparison of these two cases in-
terestingly reveals that, notwithstanding the social benet of reducing double marginalization,
vertically integration can still cause a net reduction in social welfare due to anti-competitive
segmentation of the downstream market.
38 Indeed, Lambertini and Rossini focus on the zero-investment prisoner dilemma equilibrium
which arises in this game if (b2)  (b1) < F and (b1)  (1) < F; while (b2)  (1) > F .
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centive would enter our model and combine with the incentive of preempting or
softening downstream rent extraction by means of weaker or stronger di¤erentia-
tion, complicating the analysis. Our point here is that this complication would not
help gaining much insight on the e¤ect of a vertical integration threat on product
di¤erentiation.
To illustrate, consider our integration preemption result via less di¤erentiation
in proposition 2. Suppose that b1 in the current extension equals the critical value
E in the proposition, so that each downstream rms expected prot gain if only
one of them invests is pinned down by the grey point marked on the grey line
in Figure 2.39 Furthermore, each rms expected prot gain associated with two
simultaneous investments, leading to b2 < E , will end up in the dip of the grey
line. To x ideas, let b2 equal  in the Figure. Assume, nally, that, in the
benchmark case (i.e., along the black line in the Figure), D(b2) D(b1) > F and
D(b1)  D(1) > F , so that (as it can be easily veried) both rms would invest
in equilibrium in the absence of integration threats.
Under the integration threat, the drop in prot expectation at b2 will generate
now an expected prot loss associated with an additional investment in di¤eren-
tiation, N (b2)   D(b1) < 0; whereas the expected prot gain associated with a
single investment would still be given by D(b1)  D(1) > F: As it can be easily
veried, the solution of the integration game would now give us two equilibria where
only one rm invests. In other words, competition in product di¤erentiation would
just give the same result illustrated in Figure 2: because of the vertical integration
threat, product di¤erentiation would be limited to E instead of leading to the
lower degree of substitutability .
More generally, despite the new strategic motives introduced by non-cooperative
di¤erentiation, a jump (upwards or downwards) in the expected prot due to an
integration threat would generally a¤ect the equilibrium outcome of the di¤erenti-
ation game in the same direction already captured by our cooperative measure of
the di¤erentiation incentive.
5.3. Upstream competition
At a rst glance, upstream market competition would seem to weaken the com-
petition for integration channel of downstream rent extraction, as a separated down-
stream rm would depend less on any vertically integrated rm for the provision
of input, and the upstream rms might now end up playing against each other
for vertical integration. In this extension we show, on the contrary, not only that
this channel of downstream rent extraction is robust to the presence of upstream
competition if, as intuition suggests, the upstream rms have su¢ ciently strong
39A clarication on our use of Figure 2 here is in order. Strictly speaking, the grey and black lines
in the Figure represent the downstream rms joint prot gain from di¤erentiation (under non-
prohibitive and prohibitive integration costs, respectively). Here we are using them to represent
each individual rms prot gain as arising from the simultaneous di¤erentiation decisions of the
two rms. As any individual rms prot gain is just half of the joint prot gain, the shape of
the former (as a function of the degree of di¤erentiation), which is what matters here, is exactly
the same as the shape of the latter. The two lines can therefore be equally used to represent
qualitatively each individual rms prot gain in the di¤erentiation game.
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bargaining power at the integration stage (rst claim). But also that its e¤ects
can be magnied by competition for integration being played by vertical pairs of
rms, which can cause over-investment in integration and rent dissipation. As a
consequence, both downstream rms may strictly prefer full vertical separation in
the industry (that is, they would still perceive vertical integration as a threat - of
rent dissipation now - at the di¤erentiation stage) even if they would enjoy full
bargaining power at the integration stage (second claim). Furthermore, it is even
possible that although all (upstream and downstream) rms would strictly prefer
full vertical separation, they end up in a prisoner dilemma equilibrium where they
are all (pairwise) vertically integrated (third claim).
In this extended setting, we have two upstream rms, U1 and U2, and two down-
stream rms, D1 and D2. To simplify matters, we assume that any vertically in-
tegrated rm will just transfer the input at zero internal price to its downstream
division. Three vertical structures of the industry are possible. Full vertical sepa-
ration (indexed by SS), where all rms are independent and Cournot competition
takes place both in the upstream and in the downstream markets (fully separated
successive Cournot duopoly). Partial integration (PI), where only one vertical pair,
say U1 and D1, is integrated, and engaged in Cournot competition with D2, in the
downstream market, and with U2, for the provision of input to D2, in the upstream
market (partially integrated successive Cournot duopoly). Full pairwise integration
(FI), where both pairs are integrated and engaged in Cournot competition in the
downstream market (fully integrated Cournot duopoly).
As in Matsushima (2009), the integration stage is modelled as a simultaneous
game played by predetermined vertical pairs (one upstream and one downstream
rm in each pair). The strategy set of each pair just comprises the decision to
merge, v, or to remain separated, s. Before choosing their strategy, the rms
in each pair commit to split any expected net surplus from integration arising
as a consequence of their decision according to the downstream bargaining power
parameter  2 [0; 1]. The expected net surpluses from partial integration, SPI  E,
and from full integration, SFI  E, must be in line with a consistent conjecture on
the strategy chosen by the rival pair: separation, s, for the net surplus from partial
integration; integration, v, for the net surplus from full integration. Thus:
SPI   E = PII  

SSU + 
SS
D
  E
SFI   E = FII  

PIU + 
PI
D
  E: (13)
In (13), PII and 
FI
I are the equilibrium prots of an integrated rm under par-
tial and under full integration; SSU and 
SS
D the prots of both upstream and
both downstream rms under full separation; PIU and 
PI
D those of the separated
upstream and the separated downstream rms under partial integration. These
prots and the integration cost E immediately determine the payo¤ matrix of the
integration game shown in appendix 1.40 Assume nally that, if the anticipated
40The equilibrium prots and all analytical results are derived in appendix 2. The solution of the
integration game is characterized in terms of the sign combinations of the two net surpluses from
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equilibrium outcome of the integration game is partial integration, each pair ex-ante
expects to be the merging one with probability one-half.
Firmsexpected prots before the integration stage (and hence, from the down-
stream rms viewpoint, at the di¤erentiation stage) will be:
PIDe =
1
2
 
PID

+ 12 [
SS
D +  (SPI   E)]
PIUe =
1
2
 
PIU

+ 12

SSU + (1  ) (SPI   E)

;
(14)
if the anticipated outcome is partial integration;
FIDe = 
PI
D +  (SFI   E)
FIUe = 
PI
U + (1  ) (SFI   E) ;
(15)
if the anticipated outcome is full integration;
SSDe = 
SS
D
SSUe = 
SS
U ;
if the anticipated outcome is full separation.
The following prot inequalities, proved in appendix 2 for any  2 (0; 1), are
crucial for our three claims: 41
SSD > 
PI
D ; 
SS
U > 
PI
U ; 
PI
I > 
FI
I : (16)
Consider rst partial integration as the expected equilibrium outcome. Al-
though it requires SPI   E > 0 (see footnote 40), the rst inequality in (16),
SSD > 
PI
D , immediately implies that, for su¢ ciently small values of , the down-
stream rmsexpected prot PIDe in (14) falls short 
SS
De
, which is our rst claim.
The same argument applies when full integration is the expected outcome, which
requires SFI   E > 0: again the rst inequality in (16) assures that FIDe < SSDe
when  is small enough.
To prove our other two claims, notice rst that inequalities (16) allow any of
the two surpluses from integration in (13) to be greater than the other. More
precisely, as shown in appendix 2, the ranking of the gross surpluses, SFI and
SPI ; reverses only once in the range  2 (0; 1), and shows higher values for SFI
integration. The game admits: 1) the unique full integration equilibrium (v; v), if SFI   E > 0,
SPI E > 0; 2) the two partial integration equilibria (v; s) and (s; v), if SFI E < 0; SPI E > 0;
3) the unique full separation equilibrium (s; s), if SFI  E < 0, SPI  E < 0; 4) the two equilibria
(v; v) and (s; s), if SFI   E > 0; SPI   E < 0. All sign combinations of the two surpluses turn
out to be possible for di¤erent degrees of product di¤erentiation and integration cost levels.
41Their interpretation is simple. Partial vertical integration allows the integrated rm to fore-
close part of the upstream rivals market, and compete with it on equal ground for the provision of
input to the separated downstream rm. The latter is left in the position of a high cost competitor
in the downstream market, losing market share and prots at the advantage of the downstream
division of the integrated rm (which is provided with the essential input at zero internal price).
Both (upstream and downstream) separated rms are therefore worse o¤ under partial integration
than under full separation. Furthermore, the resulting overall prots of the integrated rm under
partial integration always exceeds those of an integrated rm under full integration, as the latter
is constrained by the tougher competitive pressure of a symmetric, equally e¢ cient, integrated
competitor.
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when di¤erentiation is su¢ ciently strong (low values of ). Then, with su¢ ciently
strong di¤erentiation and high integration costs, we can have full integration with
arbitrarily small values of the net surplus SFI  E. In this case, the rst inequality
in (16), SSD > 
PI
D , implies now 
FI
De
< SSDe for any  2 [0; 1]. That is, our second
claim: both downstream rms may perceive full integration as a threat (of rent
dissipation now) even if they would enjoy full bargaining power at the integration
stage. In appendix 2, we nally prove our third claim: in the same parameter
region (i.e., for high values of E and low values of ), full integration can arise as
the unique equilibrium of the integration game, whilst all rms would be strictly
better o¤ under full separation. Interestingly, as in our baseline model with strong
di¤erentiation opportunities and any mode of downstream competition, vertical
integration preemption would again require less product di¤erentiation.
6. RELATED LITERATURE
Interesting contributions in the recent literature have considered the e¤ects of
vertical relations on process and product innovations. Stefanidis (1997) shows that
upstream rms may use exclusive dealings to disincentivize rivals investment in
process innovations. In Banarjee and Lin (2003), downstream rmsprocess inno-
vation is fostered by a raising the rival cost e¤ect. Brocas (2003) and Buehler and
Shmutzler (2008) analyze endogenous vertical integration and process innovations.
In Brocas (2003) upstream rmsinnovations (licensed to downstream rms) and
vertical integration mutually reinforce when switching to alternative technologies
is not too costly. Buehler and Schmutzler (2008) unveils an intimidation e¤ect
which strengthens a vertically integrated rms incentive to invest in downstream
innovations, showing that full vertical separation becomes less likely. Chen and Sap-
pington (2010) studies the combined e¤ect of vertical integration and downstream
competition (i.e., Bertrand v. Cournot competition) on an upstream monopolists
incentive to invest in process innovations. Economides (1999) shows that vertical
integration can improve overall product quality in a successive monopoly model
with endogenous (upstream and downstream) quality choices. Milliou (2004), Mil-
iou and Petrakis (2011) and Allain et al. (2011), study the e¤ects of informational
spillovers potentially conveyed by vertically integrated rms on downstream inno-
vation.
Recent empirical and theoretical studies focus on the e¤ects rmsinnovation
activities, in turn, exert on vertical relations. Ulrich and Ellison (2005) provide
interesting empirical evidence of the impact of product design on the vertical orga-
nization of production in the U.S. mountain bicycle industry. Still on the empirical
side, Fresard et al. (2016) nd that rms in high R&D industries are overall less
likely to vertically integrate, arguing this would arise from an incentive to retain
exibility and residual right of control on intangible assets to nalize innovations.
A similar argument has recently been advanced, in the managerial and contract law
literatures, to explain the high level of vertical disintegration and R&D outsourcing
observed in high-tech industries relative to what the standard hold-up theory of ver-
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tical integration would suggest: independent developers of technological modules
would be better able to diversify research and thereby circumvent dried techno-
logical lines (Chesbrough, 2004; Gilson et al., 2008).42 On the theoretical side,
Liu (2016) explains the coexistence of vertically integrated and vertically separated
rms in innovative industries by modelling a stronger incentive to integrate when
upstream and downstream innovations are both important along the value creation
line. Relative to these studies, we show that, besides exibility or vertical com-
plementarities in innovation activities, a threat of rent extraction via competition
for vertical integration, linked to horizontal spillovers in innovation activities like
product design, market positioning, and informative advertisement, can a¤ect the
attitude of innovative rms towards vertical mergers, with concerning e¤ects on
innovation and social welfare.
Several works have analyzed the e¤ects of (exogenous) horizontal product dif-
ferentiation on the incentives for vertical integration and foreclosure (e.g. Ordover,
Saloner and Salop, 1990, Colangelo, 1995, Hackner, 2001, Chen, 2001, Economides,
2004), stressing the countervailing e¤ect on vertical foreclosure. A related literature
focuses on the relationship between input specialization and downstream product
di¤erentiation under alternative vertical structures (Choi and Yi, 2000, Pepall and
Norman, 2001, Belleamme and Toulemonde, 2003). Matsushima (2009) is the
paper closest to ours in this literature. In a successive di¤erentiated duopoly à
la Hotelling (where upstream market transportation costs stand for input conver-
sion costs), it shows that vertical integration can x the downstream rmshold
up problem of strengthening, through di¤erentiation, the bargaining power of spe-
cialized suppliers, but the net e¤ect on social welfare may be negative because of
anti-competitive segmentation of the downstream market. Our main nding in the
mere market segmentation extension of our model (section 5.1), that the compe-
tition for integration threat can impose on society a net welfare cost in terms of
anti-competitive market segmentation, closely relates to Matsushimas result, al-
though vertical integration plays quite a di¤erent role in our setting. We also relate
to Matsushima (2009) for the way we model the integration game in the upstream
competition extension (section 5.3).
We are in line with the traditional hold-up theory of vertical integration in
assuming that rms may fail in xing ine¢ ciencies by themselves because of a
lack of commitment power, in our case to refrain from triggering competition for
integration (on the upstream side) and to compete for integration (on the down-
stream side). However, the asset-specic investments of the traditional theory and
our investment activities lie at opposite extremes on a crucial dimension. While
the former generate exclusive value for individual, specic, relationships, the latter
spill over potential value for a set of alternative relationships. Vertical integration
42The view that independent innovators and start-up companies carry important exibility ad-
vantages which may be lost by excessive industry consolidation is frequently reported by operators
and specialized commentators of high-tech industries. See, for instance, "Pre-integrated and pack-
aged solutions deliver simplication but could threaten innovation" in Global Telecom Business
CIO and CFO Guide to OSS/BSS: March/April 2011.
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then xes the hold-up problem and recovers investment e¢ ciency in the standard
theory, but creates investment ine¢ ciencies in our model. Interestingly, Allain et
al. (2016) show that, by inducing hold-up problems in the vertical relationships of
competitors, vertical integration can be the cause of, rather than the therapy for,
investment ine¢ ciencies also in the standard theory.
Finally, the dampening e¤ect of intense downstream competition (i.e., Bertrand
instead of Cournot competition) on an integrated rms incentive to foreclose a
downstream rival, discussed in section 4.2, parallels an interesting argument recently
advanced by Chen (2016) to question the theoretical rationale of price squeezing
(i.e., market foreclosure through rivals cost raising) as an exclusionary practice.
Instead of foreclosing the market to enforce an high-cost monopoly, Chens argu-
ment goes, a vertically integrated rm would better relocate nal production to a
more e¢ cient downstream rival, and thereby reap at least part of the consequent
e¢ ciency gain as upstream prots (via its input sales to the rival). A similar incen-
tive is at work in our case, but arising now from mild product di¤erentiation and
intense downstream market competition rather than cost asymmetries. Instead of
foreclosing the market to enforce an homogeneous monopoly (via a large gap be-
tween the external and the internal input prices), an integrated rm would better
leave a slightly di¤erentiated downstream competitor active in the market, and
thereby extract at least part of consumersgain from variety as upstream prots
(via high, internal and external, input prices).
7. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The central message of our paper is that new prot opportunities created by
independent developers of innovative products may attract aggressive upstream
takeovers which can negatively impact the developersincentives to innovate. Lack
of commitment to resist aggressive takeovers (i.e., to refrain from engaging in compe-
tition for integration), on the one hand, and the expectation of tougher competitive
pressure in the product market by an integrated rm, on the other hand, can in-
centivize these independent innovators to set their product characteristics in such a
way to preempt (or soften) the rent extraction associated with the takeovers, even
at the cost of foregoing protable and valuable innovation opportunities.
Documenting preemption is of course problematic. Exogenous changes in an-
titrust or corporation law could in principle be used to gain indirect evidence of it,
although any associated change in rms innovation and di¤erentiation activities
would likely mix di¤erent e¤ects, probably di¢ cult to disentangle.43 At any rate,
our ndings would o¤er the empirical work a main testable prediction: higher (ver-
tical) takeover risk, as possibly associated with a more permissive legal framework,
would negatively a¤ect independent rmsproduct di¤erentiation and innovation
activities in innovative and competitive industries.
43For instance, stricter anti-takeover rules would also a¤ect managerial incentives, and the di-
rection of this e¤ect is still an open question in the agency cost literature on corporate governance.
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If our message is broadly consistent with a concern, reported from di¤erent lit-
eratures, high-tech operators and specialized commentators, that vertical mergers
and consolidation in high-tech sectors may waste a range of benecial e¤ects guar-
anteed by independent developers, more focused evidence of its relevance can be
inferred from emblematic examples.
Consider rst a soft-innovation industry case, iconic in the US legal debate
on corporate social responsibility: the Unilevers takeover of Ben and Jerrys Ice
Cream. The innovation component in this story is Ben and Jerrys pioneering a
new product, an eco-friendly socially responsible ice cream brand initially niched
in the hippy culture of the early 70s. The April 2000 acquisition by Unilever (one
of the largest consumer good multinationals, intensively resorting to merger and
acquisition strategies in a range of sectors, ice cream included) apparently took place
despite the contrariety of the Ben and Jerrys founders and managers, concerned
of a likely negative impact of the acquisition on the distinctive characteristics of
their brand and company (arguably valued by certain types of consumers). The
most interesting point for us arises from the corporate law debate opened by this
case, where the legal obligation for a public company to accept the best takeover
o¤er to insure shareholderswealth maximization has been advocated as the reason
for the nal "forced" decision of the founders-managers to sell, as well as a possible
disincentive to create value through social innovations (Page and Katz, 2012). In
the debate, the development of alternative corporate forms has been suggested
in order to strengthen the commitment to resist aggressive takeovers and recover
incentives.44
The second case is from the innovation-intensive sector of video games devel-
opment. Commenting the recent attempts of Vivendi SA (a multinational mass
media conglomerate) to take over Ubisoft (a publishing and development power-
house), Ubisoft Vice President of live operations, Anne Blondel-Jouin, stressed the
relationship between the company independence and its innovative potential in the
following terms: "What made us so successful for 30 years is being super indepen-
dent, being very autonomous [...]. This is what we want to remain, its what has
made us successful and been able to deliver the type of games weve been delivering
[...].45 If this concern clearly refers to the expected negative e¤ect of a successful
takeover, the key role independence seems to play in the innovation culture of this
company suggests that its innovation and marketing strategies could well be af-
fected by a persistent risk of takeovers. Furthermore, the incentive to start-up and
develop innovative companies with a similar culture would likely be undermined by
an industry environment characterized by high and persistent takeover risks.
We have abstracted from too many possible sources of social costs and benets,
well scrutinized in the vast literature on vertical integration, to derive anything
44Since 2008, alternative corporate forms, such as low-prot limited liability companies, benet
corporations, and exible purpose corporations, have actually been designed and introduced in
several US states to better t social enterprises.
45 Interview of Anne Blondel-Jouin with PCgamesN, 24 November 2016:
http://www.pcgamesn.com/ubisoft-vivendi-takeover-bid
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but tentative antitrust policy implications from our results. A possible one is that
in di¤erentiated competitive industries vertical foreclosure strategies tend to be
less important, so that focusing on pre- and post- merger indicators of market
concentration and dominance in the a¤ected markets may not be crucial. On the
contrary, it is in these industries that, according to our results, an upstream threat
of rent extraction via competition for integration is more likely to arise and to
hinder socially valuable di¤erentiation. Of course, if preempted, a merger will
never end up under the scrutiny of the authorities. However, paying attention to
possible indicators of rent extraction through this channel in the examined cases,
such as the takeover price and the recent history of alternative o¤ers to or from
other rms, may increase its expected legal costs and therefore reduce the possible
social costs associated with its preemption.
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Appendix 1
Proof of lemma 1. (We drop all functional notations as they are irrelevant for the
proof). Notice preliminary that any o¤er P > D + (S   E) would be rejected by rm
U , as its payo¤ (equation (8)) would be negative.
Condition (2) implies D < D + (S   E): In this case, any downstream rm Di
will nd it optimal to:
 Bid PDi = D +(S E) if the rival, rm Dj , bids any o¤er PDj > D+(S E)
(surely rejected by the upstream rm) or does not submit any o¤er. PDi would
be accepted, securing rm Di a higher payo¤ than any lower o¤er, which rm U
would accept, as well as any higher o¤er, which rm U would reject leaving each
downstream rms with the vertical separation prot D:
 Slightly undercut any rivals o¤er N < PDj  D + (S   E):46 Bidding above
the rival would leave rm Di as the independent rm under vertical integration,
with payo¤ N . Matching the rivals o¤er would give rm Di equal probability of
being independent or integrated, with expected prot 12 (PDj + N ): Undercutting
the rivals o¤er by an arbitrarily small amount  > 0; would guarantee rm Di to
be integrated at the price and prot PDj    > 12 (PDj + N ) > N :
 Bid, indi¤erently, any o¤er PDi  N if the rival bids PDj  N . Firm Dis
prot would equal N in any case, either because it will be the independent rm
under vertical integration (if PDi > PDj ) or because it will have equal probability
of being independent or integrated at price N (if PDi= PDj= N ).
It follows that, in equilibrium, at least one rm must o¤er N , while the other is
indi¤erent between any o¤er greater than or equal to N . This usual "latitude" in the
equilibrium set with symmetric undercutting strategies is fully irrelevant for the equilib-
rium outcome of our integration game: rm U will accept the takeover o¤er P = N
(gaining more than the net surplus form integration) and both downstream rms will
symmetrically expect to earn N (either because randomly selected as the merging rm,
or because surely left outside the merger as an independent rm).
Violation of condition (2) implies D + (S   E) < D: In this case, there are two
possible equilibrium outcomes. The one derived above, leading to vertical integration at
the takeover price N , and the one selected in the statement of the lemma, where each
downstream rm submits an o¤er which rm U would surely reject (any o¤er P > D
+ (S   E) will do), and the latter reject leaving both downstream rms with prot D:
Clearly, no downstream rm has now an unilateral incentive to deviate from its equilibrium
strategy by making an o¤er P  D + (S   E) < D which rm U would surely accept.
Vertical integration therefore does not occur.
46Recall that, by (A1.2), N () < D () for any  2 (0; 1).
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From the viewpoint of the downstream rms (the only active players at the bidding
stage of the integration game), the rst equilibrium outcome is strictly Pareto dominated
by the second, adopted in the text. Pareto dominance is therefore a rst selection criterion
which would pin down the equilibrium adopted in the statement of the lemma. Further-
more, since the supporting equilibrium strategy of each player in the adopted equilibrium
outcome (i.e., submit an o¤er which would surely be rejected) weakly dominates the
players supporting strategy in the discarded equilibrium outcome, only the former would
survive trembling hand perfection or risk dominance renements.
Proof of proposition 1. In appendix 2 (online), we calculate:
SC () = 2
(2 2)(+2)2
 
a
2
2
SB () =
(3 2 2+2)
2(1+)(2 )2
 
a
2
2
:
Parameter a is clearly irrelevant for the shape of the two functions on [0; 1]: Plotting
them gives the respective shapes stated in the proposition (the plots are also collected in
appendix 2).
Proof of proposition 3. Part i). For b 2 (0; h]; equations (12) and (7) imply:bkh (b)  bkp (b) = 2N (b)  2D(b);
which, by A1.2, is strictly negative for b 2 (0; 1):
Part ii). For b 2 [m1; m1], equations (11) and (7) imply:bkm (b)  bkp (b) = 2D(b)  2 [D(b)  D(1)] = 2D(1) > 0:
Part iii). In Appendix 2 (on-line), for the linear quadratic specication we calculate:
bks (b) = 2N (b) = 2 1 2 22  a2 2bkp (b) = 2 CD(b)  CD(1) = 2(5 4 2)9(+2)2  a2 2 :
Plotting these two expressions (normalization of parameter a is irrelevant), we then show
that bks(b) R bkp(b) implies b S 0:89:
Payo¤matrix of the integration game in section 5.3.
pair 2
v s
v FII   E ; FII   E PII   E ; PID + PIU
pair 1
s PID + 
PI
U ; 
PI
I   E SSD + SSU ; SSD + SSU
[Appendix 2 (online) - separate annex]
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